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Informing Capital Juries
About Parole: The Effect on Life or
Death Decisions
BY C. LINDSEY MORRILL*
INTRODUCTION
A jury is deliberating the most serious of all decisions in the United
rtlStates justice system: Should a defendant who has been found
guilty of capital murder be put to death for his crime or receive a life
sentence? In the minds of these twelve jurors, one emotion runs rampant.
Rather than a feeling of responsibility and justice, the all-consuming
emotion is fear. After hearing an account of how the defendant violently
murdered his elderly neighbor,' the jury is afraid that the guilty defendant
will be released. The prosecution urges the jurors to choose a death
sentence as an "act of self defense"2 and argues that the defendant's future
dangerousness must be a factor in their decisionmaking? Their choice is
to recommend execution for the guilty party or to recommend a life sen-
tence.
These jurors, like a majority of Americans, distrust the sentencing
process.4 They may have heard from news media and movies5 that a "life
sentence" is actually a misnomer, and that parole may dramatically reduce
*J.D. expected 2002, University of Kentucky.
'See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,156 (1994) (plurality opinion).2 Id at 157.3 Id
4 See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion:
Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1993); William W.
Hood III, Note, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on
Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REv. 1605 (1989); John Christopher
Johnson, Note, When Life Means Life: Juries, Parole, and Capital Sentencing, 73
N.C. L. REv. 1211 (1995).
' See Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror
Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18
COLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 211,212 n.1 (1987).
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the sentence.6 The jury decides to use the only resource at its disposal and
sends a single question to the judge: "Does the imposition of a life sentence
carry with it the possibility of parole?"7 The judge, knowing that the
defendant is ineligible for parole or early release, follows the common law
precedent by informing the jury that the possibility of parole is of no
concern to them, and that they must construe the terms "death sentence"
and "life imprisonment" in their plain and ordinary language.' Within
twenty-five minutes, the jury sentences the defendant to death.9
This scenario was a reality in Simmons v. South Carolina.0 Although
the defendant was ineligible for parole, the jury was unaware of that fact
and was motivated by fear, rather than truth, in sentencing Simmons to die
for his crimes." The United States Supreme Court found that, by withhold-
ing this information from the jury, the trial court violated Simmons'
Fourteenth Amendment 2 due process rights. 3 The Court held that due
process required that Simmons be allowed to inform the jury of his parole
ineligibility as a means of denial or explanation when the prosecution
argues his future dangerousness to society. 4 The preclusion of such
information was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
This decision has spurred a discussion of the wisdom of the common
law approach that keeps parole information away from the jury. 6 The
rationale given for this approach is based on cases where the defendant
could have been released in the future.' Courts expressed concern that
6 See generally Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing
Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 812-13 (1975) (analyzing the "Private Slovik
Syndrome," i.e., the expectation that a sentence will not be fully carried out).
'Simmons, 512 U.S. at 160 (plurality opinion).
8
9Id.
10 Id at 154.
1 Id. at 161.
12 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
" See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171 (plurality opinion).
14 Id at 169.
15 See id.
6See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 4, at 1211; Kimberly Metzger, Note, Resolving
the "False Dilemma": Simmons v. South Carolina and the Capital-Sentencing
Jury's Access to Parole Ineligibility Information, 27 U. TOL. L. REv. 149 (1995).
17See, e.g., State v. Junkins, 126 N.W. 689 (Iowa 1910); Commonwealth v.
Strong, 563 A.2d 479 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 81 A.2d 569 (Pa.
1951); Jones v. Commonwealth, 72 S.E.2d 693 (Va. 1952); Coward v. Common-
wealth, 178 S.E. 797 (Va. 1935), overruled by Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532
S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000).
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giving juries such information would be prejudicial to the defendant
because the jury may be unduly harsh in order to compensate for the
possible administrative decision of early release."8 Many judges misapply
the common law approach in cases where defendants are ineligible for
parole.19 This lack of information about parole forces the jury to be unduly
harsh.
In 1993, data was gathered fromjurors who sat in capital cases in South
Carolina.20 Although South Carolina statutes do not list future dangerous-
ness as a statutory aggravating circumstance,2' the state may offer
aggravating evidence in addition to what is in the statute. ' South Carolina
prosecutors frequently argue that jurors should consider the defendant's
future dangerousness when deciding between life and death sentences.' In
assessing dangerousness, the probable true duration of a sentence is an
important consideration. The data collected showed that the 'jurors'
deliberations emphasize dangerousness and that misguided fears of early
"
8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Crittenton, 191 A. 358 (Pa. 1937).
19 See Coward, 178 S.E. at 799 (holding that parole information should not be
a consideration of the jury); see also Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d
602, 615 (Va. 1999). In dealing with jurors' inquiry into parole possibilities when
the defendant is parole ineligible, the court held that "[t]he Coward rule simply
does not address th[is] unique situation." Id
20 See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 4, at 2-3. Data gathered for the article was
part of the Capital Jury Project, a National Science Foundation-funded, multi-state
research effort exploring death penalty decisionmaking. Id at 3 (citing to Justice
Research Ctr., Northeastern Univ., Juror Interview Instrument, National Study of
Juror Decision Making in Capital Cases (on file with Eisenberg & Wells)). Thirty-
one South Carolina cases were included in the study. Through juror interviews,
researchers collected data on the facts of the crime, the juror deliberation process,
characteristics of the defendant and of the victim, and the conduct of the case by
defense counsel, prosecutor, and judge. Id
21 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). The death
penalty can only be imposed if at least one statutory aggravating circumstance has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of the aggravating circumstances
include murder committed during the commission of certain serious crimes such
as kidnaping and rape, murder of a police officer, and murder by a defendant
previously convicted of murder. Once an aggravating circumstance has been
proven, the jury may then consider statutory mitigating circumstances. Some of
these include lack of prior convictions for violent crime, age or mental capacity of
the defendant, duress, and provocation. Id.
z Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 4, at 4.23 Id
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release generate death sentences."24 Those jurors who believe that the
alternative to death will be a relatively short prison sentence are likely to
vote for death.' Jurors who believe that the alternative prison sentence will
be longer tend to sentence life.26 The data showed that for twelve cases in
which the jury gave a life sentence, the average time that the jurors
expected the defendant to serve in prison was 23.8 years.27 In nineteen
cases in which the jury sentenced the defendant to death, the average
expectation of time that the defendant would serve was 16.8 years. 28 A
separate statewide survey in South Carolina showed that more than three-
quarters of jury-eligible respondents believed the amount of time a
convicted murderer would actually have to serve in prison to be an
"extremely important" or "very important" factor in a capital sentencing
decision.29
Expected life sentences certainly play a major role in sentencing
deliberations, and, because ofthis,jurors should receive accurate informa-
tion regarding the alternative true prison sentence. Before the Court's
opinion inSimmons,judges often refused to inform juries about parole even
when juries specifically asked.3° Even after Simmons, the circumstances in
which jurors have unlimited access to parole information remain limited.
The only case in which ajury can obtain information on parole eligibility
is when the prosecution is arguing future dangerousness as an aggravating
factor3 ' If the prosecution does not argue the defendant's dangerousness,
the negative implication of Simmons is that common law holdings such as
the one in Cowardv. Commonwealth still apply, prohibiting the trial judge
from instructing jurors about the possibility of parole in the life alternative
to a death sentence.32
' Id.; see also William Bowers, Note, CapitalPunishment and Contemporary
Values: People's Misgivings and the Court's Misperceptions, 27 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 157 (1993) (reporting Capital Jury Project results for two other states with
results consistent with South Carolina).
' Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 4, at 7.
2Id.
27 1d
2Id.
29 See James M. Hughes, Informing South Carolina Capital Juries About
Parole, 44 S.C. L. REv. 383 app. at tbl. 3 (1993).30 See generally W.E. Shipley, Procedure to Be Followed Where Jury Requests
Information as to Possibility of Pardon or Parole from Sentence Imposed, 35
A.L.12d 769,771 (1954).
31 See Simmonsv. South Carolina, 5 12U.S. 154,171 (1994) (plurality opinion).
32 Coward v. Commonwealth, 178 S.E. 797, 799 (Va. 1935), overruled by
Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000).
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This Note examines the trend of putting more information in the hands
of the jury. While much of the debate has focused on whether judges
should withhold information about parole ineligibility in death penalty
cases, the policies behind the decisions are applicable in all jury sentencing
trials 3 Part I examines cases decided under the common law approach
before the Supreme Court issued its Simmons ruling. 4 Part U focuses on the
rationale and decision in Simmons. 5 Part I looks at how some states have
begun to extend Simmons, using the rationale behind that decision to
develop case law that allows full disclosure of parole options.36 Part IV
concludes by looking at Kentucky's approach mandating bifurcated penalty
proceedings that consist of, first, a separate death penalty deliberation in
which parole options are not disclosed and, second, a truth in sentencing
proceeding which allows full disclosure of the possibility of parole to the
jury?7
I. EXAMINING THE CASE LAW BEFORE SIMMONS:
PROHIBITING CONSIDERATION OF PAROLE
Traditionally, prosecutors were prohibited from mentioning the possi-
bility of early release or parole." If the possibility of parole was brought
up, it constituted prejudicial error.39 The correct response to any parole
questions by the jury was to remind the jurors that it was of"no concern"
to them.40
According to case law, a court has two grounds for denying the capital
sentencing jury access to parole information: separation of functions and
prejudice to the defendant 4 First, an argument has been made that the
judge should not make the jury aware of the defendant's parole options
33See discussion infra Parts II-IV.
34See discussion infra Part I.
3sSee discussion infra Part H.
36See discussion infra Part I.
"See discussion infra Part IV.
3 See Shipley, supra note 30, at 771.
39See, e.g., Gaines v. Commonwealth, 46 S.W.2d 75,78 (Ky. 1932); Common-
wealth v. Carey, 82 A.2d240,243 (Pa. 1951); Porter v. State, 151 S.W.2d 171,174
(Tenn. 1941).
0 See, e.g., Hinton v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 704, 706 (Va. 1978)
(directing the trial judge to instruct jurors that "what might afterwards happen is
of no concern to them"); Coward v. Commonwealth, 178 S.E. 797,799-800 (Va.
1935), overruled by Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000).
41 See Metzger, supra note 16, at 168.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
since the function of the jury in sentencing is separate from the functions
of either a parole board or a governor in granting probations or pardons.42
In Porter v. State,43 the Supreme Court of Tennessee commented on the
necessity of keeping executive matters out of the hands of the jury."
During the trial phase in Porter, the jury's question concerning the
possibility of a pardon went unanswered.45 The court held that the judge
responded properly in saying, "The power to grant pardons is vested
exclusively in the Governor, and the jury should not engage in speculations
as to what he may or may not do with respect to those incarcerated in the
penitentiary." Taking the view that matters of pardon or parole are
exclusively for executive determination and should not receive any weight
in the judicial function of assessing punishment, courts have repeatedly
held that the matter is not proper for the jury's consideration.47
The second rationale that has been used to argue thatjurors should not
have access to parole information regarding the defendant is that such
information may cause the jury to become prejudiced against the
defendant.' Courts have anticipated that jurors might decide on harsher
sentences if they know that the defendant could be eligible for parole too
soon. In Commonwealth v. Crittenton,49 the prosecution speculated to the
jury that at some future time the defendant might be paroled.5" After the
jury reached a verdict of death, Crittenton appealed, claiming that "remarks
made by the prosecuting attorney... were prejudicial and prevented the
42 See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
43 Porter, 151 S.W.2d at 171.
44Id at 174.
4 5 d.46Id.
Id; see also Commonwealth v. Mills, 39 A.2d 572 (Pa. 1944) (holding that
in order for the duties of the sentencing jury and the duties of the board of pardons
to remain separate and distinct, the trial judge must not respond to the capital
sentencing jury's inquiry regarding parole by informing the jury that the defendant
could apply to the board for a commutation).
48 See infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
41 Commonwealth v. Crittenton, 191 A. 358 (Pa. 1937).
o Id at 360 n. 1. The appeal was based on the following statements from the
prosecutor:
And there have been cases where that has meant only 12 or 14 years and we
all know it. Life imprisonment? Is there any such a thing under our system
of parole? Under our present system of parole, how do we know in the
future but that this man will be paroled at some future date?
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jury from reaching a fair verdict."'" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
examined fairness to the defendant as a controlling factor in weighing the
appropriateness of comments regarding parole ineligibility.52 In reversing
the death sentence, the court noted, "[Tihe district attorney should be
extremely careful not to become a persecutor, nor to introduce unfair
arguments tending to unbalance thejurors' minds or unduly influence their
action."53
Many states have held that this error is reversible 4 The court in
Houston v. Commonwealth" reversed a death sentence because the trial
court told the jury that a life sentence would not prevent the accused from
being pardoned.56 A death sentence was also overturned in Williams v.
State." In that case, upon inquiry by the jury as to whether a sentence for
a term of years would mean that the accused would have to stay in prison
the whole time, the trial judge answered that it would depend upon the
good behavior of the defendant and the attitude of the parole board but that
the jury has nothing to do with the issue of parole. Five minutes later the
jury returned a death sentene.5 9 The Tennessee Supreme Court overturned
the death sentence, saying that evidently the jury would have sentenced the
defendant to prison time if it had thought that he would have to serve the
full term.' The judge's proper response to the jury's question should have
been simply that the instructions already given were sufficient, and thejury
must not consider parole possibilities.6 '
, Although this rule is still prevalent when there is a possibility of parole,
many states have recognized a need to give the jury notice of a defendant's
51 d at 360.
2 Id at 361 ("[A prosecutor] must remember, as district attorney he is a quasi
judicial officer and should conduct himself as such with dignity and fairness!').53 1d.
' These states include Colorado (see, e.g., Suklev. People, 111 P.2d233 (Colo.
1941)); Georgia (see, e.g., Thompson v. State, 47 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. 1948)); Kentucky
(see, e.g., Houston v. Commonwealth, 109 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1937)); Pennsylvania
(see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 81 A.2d 569 (Pa. 1951)); Tennessee (see,
e.g., Williams v. State, 234 S.W.2d 993 (Tenn. 1950)); and Virginia (see, e.g.,
Jones v. Commonwealth, 72 S.E.2d 693 (Va. 1952)).
5
' Houston, 109 S.W.2d at 45.
1 Id at 46.
57 Williams, 234 S.W.2d at 993.
58 Id
59 Id.
6 Id at 994.
61Id
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ineligibility. In 1994, when Simmons was decided, twenty-six states used
juries for capital sentencing and provided a life imprisonment without
parole option as an alternative to the death penalty.62 In seventeen of these
states, thejury expressly received notice of the defendant's ineligibility for
parole in one of two ways: nine states simply identified the jury sentencing
alternatives as death and life without parole,' while eight states allowed the
jury itself to specify whether the defendant would or would not be eligible
for parole." In three states, statutory or decisional law required that the
sentencing jury be instructed if the defendant were ineligible for parole. 5
Three states-South Dakota, Florida, and Wyoming-had not considered
the question of whether jurors should be instructed that the defendant was
ineligible for parole under state law."
According to the Simmons plurality opinion, two states besides South
Carolina-Pennsylvania and Virginia-had a life without parole sentencing
alternative in 1994 but refused to inform the juries of this fact.67 In 1994,
however, the United States Supreme Court, in Simmons, changed that by
62 See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 167 n.7 (1994) (plurality
opinion).
63 Id; see ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a)-(c)
(Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-46a(O, (g) (West Supp. 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(a) (1995);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 905.6 (West 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030.4
(West 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VIII) (1996); WASH. REV. CODE §
10.95.030(1), (2) (2000).
' Simmons, 512 U.S. at 167 n.7 (plurality opinion); see GA. CODE ANN. § 17-
10-31.1(a) (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Michie 1998); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 413(c)(3) (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.554(2)(c) (2000); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10(A) (West Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.105 (1999);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(a)-(f) (Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
207(4) (Supp. 2001).
6S Simmons, 512 U.S. at 167 n.7 (plurality opinion); see COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-
11-103(1)(b), (4)(k) (2001); People v. Gacho, 522 N.E.2d 1146, 1166 (II1. 1988);
Turner v. State, 573 So. 2d 657, 675 (Miss. 1990).
6 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 167 n.7 (plurality opinion); see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 24-15 (Michie 1998). Florida and Wyoming have since enacted statutes that
expressly give juries notice of the defendant's ineligibility by identifying the
sentencing alternatives as death and life without parole. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
775.0823(1) (West Supp. 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-101(b), 7-13-402(a)
(Michie 2001).
67 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 168 n.8 (plurality opinion); see Commonwealth v.
Henry, 569 A.2d 929, 941 (Pa. 1990); Eaton v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 385,
392-93 (Va. 1990).
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declaring that these states' procedures of denying juries information on the
defendant's parole eligibility is unconstitutional when the prosecution
argues the defendant's future dangerousness as an aggravating factor.'
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT SIMMONS V SOUTH CAROLINA
Jonathan Dale Simmons was charged with brutally murdering Josie
Lamb, an elderly woman, during the course of a robbery.69 The week prior
to his capital murder trial, Simmons pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary
and two counts of criminal sexual conduct in connection with prior assaults
on two other elderly women.7" These guilty pleas meant that Simmons
would be ineligible for parole if convicted of any subsequent violent
offense." After a three-day trial, ajury convicted Simmons of the murder
of Josie Lamb.'
During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors argued for a death
verdict based on all of the evidence brought forth, including Simmons'
future dangerousness.' The prosecution urged the jury that the death
penalty would be "a response of society to someone who is a threat"' 4 and
stated that "[y]our verdict will be an act of self-defense."75 When the jury
asked the judge about the possibility of parole, thejudge refused to give the
obvious answer-that the defendant would be ineligible for any form of
early release.76 Instead, thejudge stated, "You are instructed notto consider
parole or parole eligibility in reaching your verdict. Do not consider parole
or parole eligibility. That is not a proper issue for your consideration. The
terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood in their
plan [sic] and ordinary meaning." The jury subsequently sentenced the
defendant to death.'
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court's refusal to
provide thejury with accurate information about his ineligibility for parole
violated both the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the U.S.
68 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 168-69 (plurality opinion).691d at 156.
70d
711 d; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000).
' Simmons, 512 U.S. at 157 (plurality opinion).
73 Id
74 Id
7 5Id.
76Md at 160.
7Id.
7 Id
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Constitution's Eighth Amendment79 and the Due Process Clause under the
Fourteenth Amendment.!' The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
death sentence, holding that the trial court's instruction in response to the
jury's inquiry satisfied in substance the defendant's request for a charge on
parole eligibility." The court stated that "a reasonable juror would have
understood from the charge given that life imprisonment indeed meant life
without parole."82 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
and remanded. 3 Although unable to agree on a single opinion, seven
justices did agree that the trial judge's instruction violated due process.'
Justice Blackmun, writing the plurality opinion for the Court, expressed the
view that in a capital trial, where the defendant's future dangerousness is
at issue and where state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires that the sentencing
jury be informed that the defendant is ineligible for parole under state
law.85
In Blackmun's opinion, he focused on Simmons' lack of opportunity
to rebut the prosecution's argument concerning future dangerousness,
writing:
In this case, the jury reasonably may have believed that petitioner could
be released on parole if he were not executed. To the extent this misun-
derstanding pervaded thejury's deliberations, it had the effect of creating
a false choice between sentencing petitioner to death and sentencing him
to a limited period of incarceration. This grievous misperception was
encouraged by the trial court's refusal to provide the jury with accurate
information regarding petitioner's parole ineligibility, and by the State's
repeated suggestion that petitioner would pose a future danger to society
if he were not executed.86
79 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Although the Eighth Amendment is intertwined
with most capital sentencing litigation, this Note consciously avoids Eighth
Amendment arguments in order to focus on the Due Process claims of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the Simmons plurality opinion was based
purely on the violation of the Due Process Clause. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 154.
80 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Simmons, 512 U.S. at 160-61 (plurality
opinion).
8' State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d 175 (S.C. 1993), rev'd, 512 U.S. 154 (1994)
(plurality opinion).82 Id at 179.
83 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 154 (plurality opinion).
4Id at 155.
gId at 169.6Id. at 161-62.
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Blackmun acknowledged that future dangerousness is a factor that can be
argued when deciding between life sentences and death sentences.87
However, the Court was also quick to point out that "[i]n assessing future
dangerousness, the actual duration of the defendant's prison sentence is
indisputably relevant."88 Even if the defendant is ineligible for parole, the
future dangerousness of the defendant can be a factor, but only in respect
to the safety of other inmates or the prison staff."9 The Court reasoned,
"The Due Process Clause will not tolerate placing a capital defendant in a
straitjacket by barring him from rebutting the prosecution's arguments of
future dangerousness with the fact that he is ineligible for parole under
state law."9
The Court recognized that most jurors do not know the true meaning
of "life imprisonment" as state statutes define the term' Any term (a life
term or a term of years) "in practice [is] understood to be shorter than the
stated term." 2 As pointed out in the dissent to the South Carolina Supreme
Court case of State v. Smith, "the reality, known to 'the reasonable juror,'
[is] that, historically, life-term defendants have been eligible for parole."'93
The instruction that life imprisonment should be understood in its "plain
and ordinary" meaning does nothing to amelioratejurors' confusion.9" "[I]f
the jury in this case understood that the 'plain meaning' of 'life imprison-
ment' was life without parole in South Carolina, there would have been no
" Id at 162; see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,275 (1976) (joint opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (noting that "any sentencing authority must
predict a convictedperson'sprobable future conduct when it engages in the process
of determining what punishment to impose").
" Simmons, 512 U.S. at 163 (plurality opinion).
89 Id. at 165 n.5.
90Id.
91 d at 169.
92Id.
93 State v. Smith, 381 S.E.2d 724,728 (S.C. 1989) (Chandler, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Historically, between 1977 and 1986, any capital
defendant sentenced to life imprisonment in South Carolina was ineligible for
parole before serving at least twenty years. See Act of June 8, 1977, No. 177, §
I(A), 1977 S.C. Acts 407, amended by The Ommbus Criminal Justice Improve-
ments Act of 1986, No. 462, § 27, 1986 S.C. Acts 2983 (codified as amended at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (A) (Law. Co-op. 1986)). Between 1948 and 1977, a
defendant serving a life sentence for a capital crime was eligible for parole after
serving only tenyears. See Act of May 26,1949,No. 199, § 2,1949 S.C. Acts 313,
amended by Act of June 8, 1977, § I(A), 1977 S.C. Acts 407.
9 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 170 (plurality opinion).
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reason for the jury to inquire about petitioner's parole eligibility."'95 The
instruction of "plain and ordinary" meaning may have misled the jury by
suggesting that parole was available, but that the court wanted the jury
unaware of that fact.96 Thus, the instruction was held to be "confusing and
frustrating to the jury."
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred with Justice
Blackmun." Souter believed that the trial court's decision in Simmons
should be reversed regardless of whether future dangerousness is an issue
at sentencing.9 Rather than looking only at the Fourteenth Amendment as
the plurality opinion did,"° Souter declared that the Eighth Amendment'
was violated when the trial judge refused to allow submission of the
defendant's parole ineligibility status to thejury.102 The Eighth Amendment
imposes a heightened standard to ensure that death is the appropriate
punishment. 3 Thus, it requires provision of "accurate sentencing
information [as] an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination
of whether a defendant shall live or die... ."I" Souter proposed that
"whenever there is a reasonable likelihood that a juror will misunder-
stand a sentencing term, a defendant may demand instruction on its
meaning...."
In dissent, Justice Scaliajoinedby Justice Thomas, made the following
primary arguments: first, the language of the prosecutor should not have
been taken as a future dangerousness argument, and second, the state
should be able to decide whether certain evidence ought to be admissible."°
The plurality opinion used two main statements from the prosecutor to
show that the prosecution acted to mislead the jury. I°7 The dissent saw the
9' Id at 170 n.lO.
96M at 170.
97Id.
" Id at 172-74 (Souter, J., concurring).
99 Id
'00 See supra note 79.
'o1 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Simmons, 512 U.S. at 172-73 (Souter, J., concurring).
'
3Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (explaining that the
Amendment imposes a heightened standard "for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case").
'04 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
101 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring).
'6MId at 180-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'
07 d at 181.
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first statement, telling the jury to decide "what to do with [petitioner] now
that he is in our midst," merely as a response to the mitigating evidence of
his troubled background. 18 The second statement, "Your verdict will be an
act of self defense," according to the dissent, is a reference to the defense
of society in general against this individual.'
A state's right to set the sentencing procedures is only unlimited if the
prosecution does not raise the future dangerousness argument."0 Future
dangerousness as an aggravating circumstance would necessarily implicate
due process rights."' The flexibility of states to set sentencing procedures
may not violate the defendant's constitutional due process rights.' This
will be discussed at length in the following section." 3
Ill. AFTER SIMMONS:
TAKING A BROADER APPROACH BY INCLUDING ALL CAPITAL CASES
According to California v. Ramos,"" "the wisdom of the decision to
permitjuror consideration of [post-sentencing contingencies] is best left to
the States.""' Although Simmons declared that the judge should disclose
parole ineligibility to the jury if future dangerousness is argued, that
decision was based on due process rights." 6 Therefore, while this is the*
minimum requirement, in the years following Simmons many states have
taken it further.
A prime example ofthe evolution of Simmons' application to jury sen-
tencing comes from Virginia." 7 Virginia originally required ajury to decide
I" Id at 181-82.
109 Id at 182.
"' If the prosecution does raise future dangerousness as an aggravating factor,
then under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, all states must
allow the defendant to counter the prosecutor's argument with the defendant's
ineligibility for parole. Id at 171 (plurality opinion).
.. See id ("Because petitioner's future dangerousness was at issue, he was
entitled to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility.').112 See generally California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
' See discussion infra Part III.
114 Ramos, 463 U.S. at 992.
5 Id at 1014. The Court found that it is within the state's discretion to keep the
Briggs Instruction, which requires courts to tell juries that the governor could
commute life sentences but does allow the jury to know that there is a possibility
that the governor will grant clemency for death sentences. Id at 1013.
136 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171 (plurality opinion).
117 See Hood, supra note 4.
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between life sentences and death sentences without the benefit of informa-
tion about the defendant's parole ineligibility." 8 This ended after Simmons,
but only in cases where future dangerousness was argued.' 9 In capital cases
where the prosecution did not mention future dangerousness as an
aggravating factor, the defendant was still denied full disclosure of his
parole ineligibility status to the jury.'20 For instance, in Cardwell v.
Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Simmons did not
apply. 2' It stated that "thejury fixed Cardwell's punishment at death based
upon the 'vileness' predicate rather than upon the 'future dangerousness'
predicate. Therefore, the issue of the applicability of Simmons may be
moot. , '
Virginia is also an interesting forum to study the admissibility of parole
ineligibility in jury trials because of its abolition of parole for all felony
offenders. The Virginia legislature enacted a statute saying that "[a]ny
person sentenced to a term of incarceration for a felony offense committed
on or after January 1, 1995, shall not be eligible for parole upon that
offense."'" With this statute in place, all felony offenders must serve the
entirety of the term given to them.124 It is likely that many jurors in Virginia
are not aware of this statutory requirement, causing continued speculation
about offenders receiving early release.'" The progression of case law in
Virginia shows how judges have used the reasoning stated in Simmons to
expand parole information admissibility to all felony penalty proceed-
ings. n6
.. See, e.g., Hinton v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 704 (Va. 1978); Jones v.
Commonwealth, 72 S.E.2d 693 (Va. 1952); Coward v. Commonwealth, 178 S.E.
797 (Va. 1935), overruled by Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va.
2000).
"9 See State v. Young, 459 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1995) (holding that Simmons is
inapplicable where there is no issue regarding the defendant's future dangerous-
ness).
'
2
' See, e.g., Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 146, 155 (Va. 1994).
121 Id
12Id
'2 VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1998).
'
24 See generally Robert P. Crouch, Jr., Uncertain Guideposts on the Road to
Criminal Justice Reform: Parole Abolition and Truth-In-Sentencing, 2 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 419 (1995).
" See, e.g., Hartigan v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 406, 412 (Va. Ct. App.
1999), adhered to en banc, 531 S.E.2d 63 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) ("We believe it is
highly likely that Hartigan's jury erroneously speculated on the continuing
availability of parole.").
126 See, e.g., Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000); Hartigan,
522 S.E.2d at 406; Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999).
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A. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth
Five years after Simmons, in Yarbrough v. Commohwealth,127 the
Supreme Court of Virginia faced a similar issue to the one in Cardwell.28
While robbing a small store, Yarbrough killed the owner of the store by
cutting around his neck in a manner consistent with a beheading. 29 The
prosecution argued "solely on the issue of whether the death penalty was
warranted because Yarbrough's crime was 'outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an
aggravated battery to the victim,' commonly referred to as the 'vileness'
aggravating factor."'30 The trial court refused to give an instruction to the
jury on the defendant's ineligibility for parole..' since the prosecution's
argument did not implicate future dangerousness.3 2 During its deliberation,
the jury sent a question to the court asking for a definition of the term "life
in prison," and specifically asking if parole would be offered after a
specified number of years had been served. 33 Thejudge answered thejury,
"[Y]ou must do whatyou feel is appropriate underthe circumstances ofthis
case and not concern yourselves with what might happen afterwards."'"
Subsequently, the jury sentenced Yarbrough to death. 35
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia looked at the underlying
policy for the decisions made in Coward36 and Hinton.3 In sum, the
underlying policy "is that the jury should not be permitted to speculate on
the potential effect of parole, pardon, or an act of clemency on its sentence
127 Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 602.
Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 146 (Va. 1994); see also supra
notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
129 Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 604.
130 Id at 606.
13 Id at 612 n.7. Yarbrough was ineligible for parole based on VA. CODEANN.
§ 53.1-165.1, which abolished parole for all felony offenses. Id.
132 1d at 606 ("The trial court refused Yarbrough's 'life means life' instruction,
stating that it was not appropriate under the current state of the law in Virginia
where the Commonwealth relies only on the vileness aggravating factor.").33 Id at 607.
13 Id.
135 Id
136 Cowardv. Commonwealth, 178 S.E. 797 (Va. 1935), overruled by Fishback
v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000) (holding that it is reversible
error to tell the jury that the sentence it imposes can be reduced by another state
entity).
13' Hinton v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 704 (Va. 1978) (holding that the
judge's emphasis on post-verdict procedures prejudiced the defendant).
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because doing so would inevitably prejudice the jury in favor of a harsher
sentence than the facts of the case might otherwise warrant." '38 This policy
had been continually utilized in cases where the defendant would have been
eligible for parole, 39 but the court recognized that Yarbrough was the
converse situation."4 Ifthejury is only deciding between the death penalty
or a life sentence without the possibility of parole, the knowledge that a life
sentence will not be reduced will have no prejudicial effect to the
defendant. 4" If anything, such knowledge would achieve the opposite
effect, benefitting the defendant.' The court reasoned that keeping the
information from the jury is more harmful in this situation because of the
possibility that the jury may speculate on the availability of parole.
The court in Yarbrough ultimately concluded that jurors do specu-
late.'" As support, the court looked at empirical research 45 and at the
multitude of cases where juries asked questions concerning the possibility
of parole when no information on that had been given to them.'" The court
also looked to evidence from the specific jury used in Yarbrough, stating
that "[t]he real danger of this possibility [of the jury erroneously speculat-
ing on the availability of parole] is amply demonstrated by the jury's
question in this case in which the jurors posited the hypothetical situation
that Yarbrough might serve as few as twelve years of a life sentence."'47
In response, the Supreme Court of Virginia carved out an exception to
the Coward rule of not allowing the jury any parole eligibility informa-
"I Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 615; see also supra notes 48-61 and accom-
panying text.
' See, e.g., Stamper v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 808, 821 (Va. 1979);
Hinton, 247 S.E.2d at 706; Coward, 178 S.E. at 797-99.
14' Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 615.
141 Id
142/d
143 Id
144Id at 616.
'41 See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 170 n.9 (1994) (plurality
opinion) ("Public opinion and juror surveys support the commonsense understand-
ing that there is a reasonable likelihood ofjuror confusion about the meaning of the
term 'life imprisonment."').
4 Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 615-16 n.10 ("[Tihe likelihoodthat the issue [of
expanding the application of Simmons] will be resolved correctly may increase if
this Court allows other tribunals 'to serve as laboratories in which the issue
receives further study before it is addressed by this Court."' (quoting Brown v.
Texas, 522 U.S. 940,943 (1997))).
1471d at 616.
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tion'" and held that when a jury is deciding between a sentence of life
without parole or death, the jury must be made aware of the defendant's
ineligibility for parole."' The court stated, "[I]n the context of a capital
murder trial a jury's knowledge of the lack of availability of parole is
necessary to achieve the same policy goals articulated in Coward and
Hinton.,150
B. Hartigan v. Commonwealth
In Hartigan v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
applied the rationale of Yarbrough to non-capital cases.' In that case,
David Hartigan was convicted of grand larceny.' In the penalty phase of
the trial, the defense counsel's request that the jury instruction include a
statement that parole had been abolished was denied. 53 The appellate court
held that the denial ofthis instruction was errorwarranting a reversal of the
conviction.
Also during the penalty phase of Hartigan's trial, the Commonwealth
introduced evidence that Hartigan had previously been convicted of six
felonies for which he had been eligible for parole.5 The Commonwealth
presented the jury with a list of convictions, the sentences imposed, and the
actual terms served."5 6 On three occasions, Hartigan was convicted of
"" Coward v. Commonwealth, 178 S.E. 797, 799 (Va. 1935), overruled by
Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000).
'49 Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 616.
150 .[d
'I Hartigan v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 406,411-12 (Va. Ct. App. 1999),
adhered to en banc, 531 S.E.2d 63 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
'
52Id at 408.
'
51 Id. at 411.
I5 ld at 413.
I551d at 412.
[T]he jury was presented with the following information: distributing a
controlled drug, October 27, 1978, eight years in prison, all suspended;
distribution of a controlled drug as an accommodation, December 7, 1979,
two years in prison; distributing a controlled drug, January 25, 1980, eight
years in prison with six years suspended; two counts of distributing a
controlled drug, October 7, 1983, five years in prison with two years
suspended on count I and five years in prison with three years suspended
in count II; possession of a controlled drug, February 19, 1988, five years
in prison; possession of a controlled drug, November 18, 1992, twelve
months in jail.
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another offense before he would have completed the sentence imposed on
a previous conviction had he not been paroled. 57 The appellate court
stated:
The presentation of this information may have led the jury to believe that
Hartigan would be eligible for parole and, as was the case with his
previous convictions, would not serve the full sentence imposed. We
believe it is highly likely that Hartigan's jury erroneously speculated on
the continuing availability of parole.'
The court reasoned that even without direct language of parole eligibility,
"[t]he obvious message to thejury was-over and over again, this man has
served only a fraction of his actual sentence and you have the opportunity
to ensure that this will not happen again by imposing a long sentence."'59
The Hartigan court rejected Coward's application to the current
circumstances under the parole abolishment statutes."6 Relying on
Yarbrough,' the appellate court held that "when evidence of prior
sentences may lead the jury to speculate that parole is still available to the
defendant, a trial judge is required to instruct the jury that the defendant,
if convicted, will be ineligible for parole."''
C. Fishback v. Commonwealth
In Fishbackv. Commonwealth, Virginia's Supreme Court took the last
step in allowing the jury to make decisions with full disclosure regarding
parole possibilities.' Richard David Fishback was convicted of eight non-
Id
157 Id
158 Id2
159 1d at 413.
110 Id at411.
161 Id at 411-12 ("Although the Court limited its decision in Yarbrough to the
effect of Code § 53.1-165.1 on sentencing in capital murder cases, it acknowledged
that 'the limitations placed upon the availability of parole by Code § 53.1-40.01
and § 53.1-165.1 may call into question the continued viability ofthe Cowardrule
in a non-capital felony case, as where, for example, a defendant subject to a
maximum term of years for a specific crime would serve that entire sentence before
being eligible for geriatric parole."' (quoting Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519
S.E.2d 602,615 (1999))).
'
6 d at413.
1 Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000).
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capital felonies including one count of robbery, three counts of abduction,
and four related firearm charges.1" Although not eligible for parole,
Fishback could eventually be eligible for geriatric release and could qualify
for a reduction in sentence through good behavior credits. " The trial court
applied the Cowardrule.' " On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the
court held that Fishback was entitled to have the jury properly instructed
as to the extent of the abolition of parole. 67 The court found that this was
a logical extension of Yarbrough, even though it was not a capital case and
the defendant was eligible for some type of sentence reduction."
The court in Fishback recognized that "juries frequently have no
comprehension of the current state of parole eligibility. . . but remain
concerned that their sentencing decisions will be subjected to extensive
reductions by executive action." 69 The problem in informing the jury of
projected release dates is that they are difficult to predict. After a jury
sentences the defendant, the length ofjail time is highly dependent on the
defendant's behavior. However, under Virginia's parole abolishment
statute, the time given for a felony must be the time served. 7 It is under
this specific statute that the Virginia Supreme Court in Fishback ruled that
the defendant should be allowed to inform the jury of the statutory
limitations and the abolition of parole."' With the statutory provisions in
place, the jury must not be left to speculate about what might occur after
the sentence is imposed."z The court reasoned that "because those statutory
provisions represent a clear departure from the broad discretion given to the
executive branch under the prior law with regard to early release and
sentence reduction, we believe that strict adherence to the Coward rule is
no longer appropriate.""
In keeping with national trends, the Virginia Supreme Court now
recognizes a "truth in sentencing" goal. 7 Generally, "truth in sentencing"
1641d at 630.
165 1d at 632; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (Michie Supp. 2001); VA.
CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-202.2 (Michie
1998).
166See Fishback, 532 S.E.2d at 630.
1671d at 635.
16 Id at 636.
169 Id at 632.
"I See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1.
'17 Fishback, 532 S.E.2d at 634.
172 Id at 633.
174 Id.; see also Symposium, The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three
Strikes Legislation: Prison Populations, State Budgets, and Crime Rates, 11 STAN.
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refers to the objective of requiring offenders to serve a substantial portion
of their imposed prison sentences.175 The impact of truth in sentencing on
jury decisions is that juries have more control. They are able to look at the
crime and know that the penalty imposed will be carried out. "[I]n the
context of achieving the goal of 'truth in sentencing,' it simply defies
reason that this information [of the defendant's parole ineligibility] ought
not to be provided to the jury by an instruction of the trial court.' '176
IV. KENTUCKY AND THE "TRUTH IN SENTENCING" MOVEMENT
To date, the Simmons decision only directly affects the states where
future dangerousness is an aggravating circumstance and where the
decision between life imprisonment or the death penalty must be made
absent any information about the defendant's possible parole
ineligibility. 1" As stated earlier, the presence of these two factors only
exists in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina. 78 Even with such a
limited scope of direct impact, the Simmons decision, and the subsequent
extension of that reasoning seen in Virginia courts, 7 9 is part of a larger
movement to put more information in the hands of the jury.'8 0 This
movement is not limited to capital punishment cases but uses the same
underlying philosophy that determines how much informationjuries should
be given about the possibility of parole for all crimes.' Juries understand-
ably desire a feeling of security and confidence that the punishment they
choose is appropriate for the crime and will be substantially carried out.
The Kentucky legislature joined this trend in 1986 when it enacted
Kentucky Revised Statute ("K.R.S.") § 532.055, the "truth in sentencing"
statute.
82
L. & POL'y REV. 75 (1999). "Truth in sentencing" is often associated with legisla-
tion that inhibits or abolishes the option of parole for certain convictions. For the
purposes of this Note, the term "truth in sentencing" refers more to legislation
which allows jurors to know decisively the term of years that the defendant will
actually serve.
" Symposium, supra note 174, at 75.76 Fishback, 532 S.E.2d at 633.
" See discussion supra Part II.
'
78 See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
'
79 See discussion supra Part III.
180 See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 124; Symposium, supra note 174.
"' See generally Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the
Jury about Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95 COLUM.L. REv. 1232(1995).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 532.055 (Michie 1999).
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K.R.S. § 532.055 is a procedural statute to be followed in the trial and
sentencing of criminal felony defendants." Under this statute, the jury is
permitted to hear some evidence in the sentencing phase that would not be
admissible in the guilt or innocence phase of the trial.'" K.R.S. §
532.055(2Xa) authorizes the jury to have information regarding parole
eligibility." This includes information regarding minimum parole
eligibility, as well as maximum expiration of a sentence for all current or
prior offenses as determined by the division of probation and parole.8
Through K.R.S. § 532.055, the legislature mandated a radical change,
abandoning a long line of cases holding that it is prejudicial error to inform
the jury about the possibility of parole."87 Traditionally, "the subject of
parole is not to be given any consideration by [the jury] in determining
innocence, guilt, or punishment."'" Based on the same rationale as
Coward,"9 Kentucky courts had reasoned that providing information about
the possibility of parole might result in prejudice "by urging the jury to
impose an excessive punishment in order to compensate for or protect
against the action of the pardoning or paroling authority."'
The Kentucky truth in sentencing statute quickly fell under criticism
from members of the Kentucky Supreme Court. 9 Although juries feel
1 See id
'
4 See id For example, § 532.055(2)(aX2) allows information regarding the
nature of any prior offenses for which the defendant has been convicted in the
sentencing proceeding even if such information would be disallowed in the trial
phase.
"15 See id § 532.055(2Xa).
196 See id. § 532.055(2XaXI), (4).
137 E.g., Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867,870 (Ky. 1981) ("The con-
sideration of future consequences such as... parole have no place in the jury's
finding of fact and may serve to distort it For that reason we now hold that neither
the prosecutor, defense counsel, nor the court may make any comment about the
consequences of a particular verdict at any time during a criminal trial."); Broyles
v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1954); Boyle v. Commonwealth, 694
S.W.2d 711 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
' Boyle, 694 S.W.2d at 712.
Coward v. Commonwealth, 178 S.E. 797 (Va. 1935), overruled byFishback
v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000).
11 Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 802 (Ky. 1987) (Leibson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 16 A.L.R3d 1137, 1141 (1967)).
191 Id at 796. The court stated:
Because K.R.S. 532.055 is a legislative attempt to invade the rule making
prerogative of the Supreme Court by legislatively prescribing rules of
practice and procedure, it violates the separation of powers doctrine
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entitled to know what will occur after they recommend a sentence, the
reality that their decisions may be swayed by speculative parole possibili-
ties when they do know that the defendant will be parole eligible is a deep
concern for the courts. 92 In the present sentencing system, when a
convicted offender is turned over to the department of corrections, the
power to determine the period of incarceration passes completely to the
parole board."t Therefore, conceivably, an offender could be released
immediately after his sentence begins.1 94 Thus, Kentucky courts are not
only dealing with prejudicial effect towards the defendant but also with
thejurors' conflicting and erroneous ideas of how and when parole is likely
to occur. "The legal reasoning underlying our previous decisions holding
such evidence [of parole eligibility] irrelevant, inflammatory, and
prejudicially erroneous, is overturned without suitable explanation .... In
its place we substitute a new approach based on half-truths and specula-
tions." 95
In Huffv. Commonwealth, the truth in sentencing statute was attacked
on the basis of its constitutionality." s Besides arguing that it was a
violation of the separation of powers, an argument that the court rejected
in Commonwealth v. Reneer,97 the defendant, Terry Lee Huff, argued
specifically that allowing evidence of minimum parole eligibility into the
penalty phase of the trial is unconstitutional based on due process, equal
protection, and vagueness.'" The court in Huffdiscussed the fact that a life
sentence has a minimum eligibility for parole of twelve years, while an
offender who has received a term of years has a minimum eligibility of'fifty
enunciated in Section 28 of the Kentucky Constitution. Nevertheless, it has
not been the policy of this court to nullify as a matter of course all
legislation which infringes to some extent upon a proper function of the
judiciary.
Id.
192 See id at 802 (Leibson, J., dissenting). See generally Amy Jo Harwood,
Note, "Comity" Revisited: The Continuing Struggle over Rulemaking Authority
Between the KentuckySupreme Court and GeneralAssembly, 86 KY. L.J. 437, 442-
47 (1997) (discussing Justice Leibson's assertions in his dissent in Reneer that the
truth in sentencing statute blatantly infringed on the judiciary's rulemaking
authority and his other criticisms of the statute).193 See K.R.S. § 439.340 (Michie 1999).
'1 See id § 532.060, cmt.
195Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 802 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
" Huffv. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. 1988).
197Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 796.
198 See Huff, 763 S.W.2d at 107.
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percent of the sentence imposed." 9 Therefore, the defendant who receives
a life sentence could be parole eligible before the defendant who receives
a sentence of twenty-five years or more."1 This may give a jury a false
impression about the actual length that most offenders serve.
In Huff, Kentucky again affirmed the constitutionality of K.R.S. §
532.055.01 Regarding the benefits of the truth in sentencing statute, the
court quoted Gregg v. Georgia:2  "We think it [desirable] for the jury to
have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentenc-
ing decision. ' The court also looked to California v. Ramos: 4 "[T]he
court at the sentencing [stage] shall inform the jury of the nature of the
sentence of imprisonment that may be imposed, including its implication
with respect to possible release upon parole....
Kentucky has recognized thatthe effectthat parole eligibility may have
on a jury could substantially alter the decision between life imprisonment
and the death sentence.20 6 To overcome this severe prejudice to the
defendant, the capital penalty sentencing phase under K.R.S. § 532.025207
is conducted before the truth in sentencing hearing.208 In the capital penalty
sentencing phase, the jury hears evidence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, including the prior record of the defendant.2" The jury also
hears arguments from both the prosecutor and the defendant regarding the
punishment each urges the jury to impose.21° At this point in the proceed-
ings, no evidence concerning the defendant's parole eligibility or ineligibil-
199Id at 107-08.2o0 Id at 108.
201 Id
' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.).203 Huff, 763 S.W.2d at 107 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204).
204 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
205Hui, 763 S.W.2d at 107 (quoting Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1009 n.23) (alteration
in original).
206 See, e.g., Francis v. Commonwealth, 752 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Ky. 1988)
(stating that even in a death penalty case, it is not improper to give the jury accurate
information of which both the defendant and counsel are aware).
2m See K.R.S. § 532.025 (Michie Supp. 2001) (instructing capital penalty sen-
tencing).218 See Francis, 752 S.W.2d at 311 (holding that "in any case in which the death
penalty phase is sought, the capital penalty sentencing phase pursuant to KRS
532.025 should be conducted before the truth-in-sentencing hearing under KRS
532.055(2)... ').209 See K.R.S. § 532.025(l)(b).
210See id
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ity2" can be admitted." If evidence is introduced, then it is grounds for
reversal and re-sentencing.2 3
This situation occurred in Perdue v. Commonwealth Ajury convicted
Tommy Perdue of complicity to commit arson, for which he was given a
life sentence, and complicity to commit murder, for which he was
sentenced to death.214 The murder conviction was based on the fact that he
had arranged for the victim's murder in exchange for money.21 The
Commonwealth, during the closing statement of the penalty phase, stated:
[A]ny penalty that you impose on this man, whether it be 20 years, 50
years, 100 years, or life, he is going to be eligible for parole in 12
years.... The time has come for this man to get the death penalty. If you
give him anything less, he is going to be out on the street... .; 20 years,
he is eligible for parole in four years.... 39 years, he is eligible for parole
in seven years and 10 months.2"6
The Supreme Court of Kentucky responded strongly to the error in the
penalty phase, stating:
[U]nder KRS 532.025, when the death penalty is sought, evidence of
minimum parole eligibility guidelines may not be introduced at all ....
this error is too great to overlook. It may well be that the jury considered
sentencing appellant to a term of years, but felt that only a death sentence
would keep him off the street.217
The court held that combining the death penalty sentencing phase and the
truth in sentencing hearing is prejudicial to the offender and constitutes
211 See id § 532.025(2)(a) (since Kentucky does not use"fiuture dangerousness"
asan aggravating circumstance, Simmons is inapplicable).212 See Perdue v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 148,163 (Ky. 1995) (when death
penalty is sought, evidence of minimum parole eligibility guidelines may not be
introduced at all); see also Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414, 422 (Ky.
1985) (when the jury sent a note to the judge asking questions about parole in a life
sentence, the court correctly instructed the jury that these were "questions which
the court cannot instruct you upon!).213 Perdue, 916 S.W.2d at 163.214 d at 153.
215 d
2 16 jd at 163.
217 Id
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reversible error 18 The court stated that "[u]nder no circumstances should
parole eligibility enter into death penalty deliberations. "219
After death penalty deliberations, thejury must recommend eitheralife
or death sentence.' In Kentucky, the jury's decision is only a recommen-
dation to the trial judge. 2 Although prosecutors cannot in any way
diminish the responsibility of the jury or the importance of its decision,
the conclusive determination is left up to the trial judge.' After the
recommendation, the truth in sentencing statute comes into play and the
minimum and maximum actual sentences are fully disclosed to the trial
judge. 4 By mandating that K.R.S. § 532.055 come into play after the
jury's recommendation, the court has attempted to find middle ground
between complete disclosure and separation of parole information from
sentencing decisions.m The judge is able to see the parole options of the
defendant and then determine if the jury's recommendation was made
fairly.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Jurors in death penalty cases are compelled to make a decision of
unequaled magnitude: whether a defendant will live or die. The goal for all
states should be to find an approach for determining which information
should be admitted so that capital jurors can be confident in their decisions
and not prejudice the defendant. Although Simmons allows defendants to
2181d. at 170.
2 19 Id. at 164.
220 See K.R.S. § 532.025(1)(b) (Michie Supp. 2001).
2'See iad
See Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 404,407 (Ky. 1985) (where the
prosecutor clearly sought to divert from the minds of the jurors their true
responsibility by implying that the ultimate responsibility of fixing the death
penalty would fall on the trial judge, it was clearly reversible error).
' See Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Ky. 1980), overruled by
Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981) (the jury's function with
regard to the ultimate sentence is limited, and its recommendation carries great
weight but is not binding on the trial judge).
2,
4See K.R.S. § 532.055; Francis v. Commonwealth, 752 S.W.2d 309,311 (Ky.
1988).
Compare Coward v. Commonwealth, 178 S.E. 797, 799-800 (Va. 1935),
overruled by Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000) (keeping
parole out of consideration of the jury), and supra Part I, with Fishback, 532
S.E.2d at 635 (allowing the jury to consider parole when deciding sentencing), and
supra Part III.C.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
counter the state's argument in the limited context where future dangerous-
ness is argued as an aggravating factor, the decision is silent as to all other
death penalty decisions." This leaves the states to determine the best
method of reducing jurors' misconceptions while preventing prejudice.
A. Separating Sentencing Proceedings
Separating proceedings in capital penalty sentencing, as Kentucky has
done in K.R.S. § 532.055 and § 532.025, is one attempt to find a balance
between allowing information of the defendant's parole options in, while
keeping the jury from being unduly harsh as a result of hearing about the
possibilities of parole. 7 Jurors are first able to decide innocence and guilt
based purely on the factual situation. 8 After the initial decision of guilt of
a capital offense, the jury proceeds to the capital penalty sentencing phase
under K.R.S. §532.025, in which aggravating and mitigating circumstances
may be weighed. 9 The jury then makes a sentencing recommendation to
the judge.230 The judge can either follow the recommendation or make her
own decision regarding whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death." At this point during the capital penalty sentencing proceeding, no
information regarding the defendant's eligibility or ineligibility for parole
is presented to either the jury or the judge. 2
Once the capital penalty sentencing phase is completed, the truth in
sentencing phase, pursuant to K.R.S. § 532.055, begins. 3 Any evidence
relating to minimum parole eligibility and the maximum expiration of the
sentence may come before the judge.? Thejudge is then able to modify the
penalty if she believes that the sentence is unfair. 5
2 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
7 See discussion supra Part IV.
2n See K.R.S. § 532.055(1). See also discussion supra Part IV.
229 K.RS. § 532.025(l)(b).
230 Id
231 See id212 See id § 532.025(2).
233 See Francis v. Commonwealth, 752 S.W.2d 309,311 (Ky. 1988) (holding
that in any case in which the death penalty is sought, the capital penalty sentencing
phase pursuant to K.R.S. § 532.025 should be conducted before the truth in
sentencing hearing under K.R.S. § 532.055(2)).234 K.R.S. § 532.055(2)(a).
23' Although the judge's responsibilities after going through the truth in sen-
tencing procedure in a capital case are unclear, the implication is that the decision
made in the capital penalty sentencing phase may be changed if the judge believes
[VOL. 90
2001-20021 INFORMING CAPITAL JURIES ABOUT PAROLE
This is not a flawless solution. Juries still do not get parole information
and may not feel confident about the parole system. This may lead to
excessively harsh results. The hope is that judges will realize the attitude
that the jury holds and, upon seeing accurate parole information, mitigate
to a more reasonable decision. On the other hand, judges may be harsh
when hearing of early parole dates and thus reject any lighter sentences that
the jury may recommend. Though not perfect, allowing for separate
proceedings in sentencing at least attempts to provide some check on
fallible decisions.
B. Instructions to the Jwy
States may also find a solution in allowing instructive and meaningful
responses by the judge when the jury asks questions concerning the
defendant's possibility of parole.u5 The United States Supreme Court made
it clear in Simmons that giving the instruction that the terms "life imprison-
ment" and "death penalty" should be understood "in their plain and
ordinary meaning" is "confusing and frustrating to the jury." 7 However,
the Court did not instruct states as to what would constitute a proper
instruction.2'8
States may fall back on the Coward rule by stating to the jury that
under no circumstances should parole be a consideration in sentencing."' 9
Although appropriate if taken literally by perfect, mechanical juries, in
practice, this instruction has been faulty.40 The lack of a substantive
answer to questions regarding parole has been shown to lead jurors to
believe that the defendant will likely be released and not serve his full
term." The instruction to ignore a belief that the defendant may be
paroled, a belief that is integrated in thejurors' decisionmaking process,242
that such a change is warranted by the new evidence disclosed pursuant to K.R.S.
§ 532.055(2).236 See Paduano & Smith, supra note 5, at 249-52.
z7 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 170 (1994) (plurality opinion);
see discussion supra Part II.
2"8 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 154 (plurality opinion).
"
9 Coward v. Commonwealth, 178 S.E. 797 (Va. 1935), overruled by Fishback
v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000).
24See generally discussion supra Part Inl.
24See discussion supra Part I.
242See Hughes, supra note 29, app. at tbl. 3.
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is arguably legal fiction.243 The probability that ajury will be able to truly
disregard this in its determination is low.24
Another possible instruction is to tell thejury that life means "until the
death of the defendant." This instruction was used by some South Carolina
courts after Simmons was decided.245 Despite being the literal meaning, the
United States Supreme Court held that even this instruction is not explicit
enough and thus violates due process.246 In Shafer v. South Carolina, the
Supreme Court reiterated Simmons' holding that the court was required to
clarify the parole ineligibility of the defendant even after thejury heard that
"life imprisonment means until the death of the defendant" and that the
defendant will" 'die in prison' after 'spend[ing] his natural life there.' 247
Because of human nature, even this instruction poses some risk that the jury
will speculate wrongly and without guidance as to parole.24
Lastly, the state may allow the judge to fully disclose the possibility of
parole to the jury, insofar as the facts of this can be ascertained.249 This
instruction has the advantage of presenting the jury with full disclosure of
the possibilities for parole which will allow the jury to make an educated
decision. However, there is still a disadvantage in cases in which the
defendant is parole eligible because the instructions could be prejudicial."
Jurors may assume that the defendant will be paroled at the first date of his
eligibility, an assumption that is untrue for virtually ninety-nine percent of
life-sentenced inmates.25
243 See Paduano & Smith, supra note 5, at 250.
244 E.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968). The Court held
that an instruction given to the jury to consider a confession only against the co-
defendant who made it was inadequate. "[T]here are some contexts in which the
risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human
limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Id24 See Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36,44 (2001).
246Id at 54.
247 Id. at 52.
24
" See id. at 53-54. Even with such instruction, the jury sought clarification,
asking, "Is there any remote chance for someone convicted of murder to become
el[i]gible for parole?" The trial court may have been misleading in responding that
"[p]arole eligibility or ineligibility is not for your consideration." Id at 53.
249 See id. at 54.
2o See discussion supra Part I.
2' See Paduano & Smith, supra note 5, at 228-29 n.53 (citing Georgia State
Board of Pardons and Paroles Annual Report: Fiscal Year 1985 (only one
percent--twelve out of 949--ofall life-sentenced inmates released upon their first
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C. Evidence
Presenting relevant evidence about parole is a critical means of
allowing information to reach the jury. 2 Evidence on parole can reach the
jury through the court taking judicial notice of statutes restricting parole
eligibility. 3 Any statute that is judicially noticed may be argued and
included in instructions to the jury.5' Another method is to permit the
defendant to present parole restrictions and predictions as mitigating
evidence during the case." This would also include evidence showing the
likelihood of the parole board granting release.256
Once evidence of parole is admitted at the sentencing phase, both the
prosecution and the defendant can use the evidence to their best advantage.
In trials where the defendant is parole ineligible, this arguably will prevent
thejury from acting in fear and pushing the death penalty.5 7 In trials where
the defendant is eligible for parole, the defendant can present evidence of
the most probable release date, which often is later than the first date of
parole eligibility." 8 The benefit of admitting parole eligibility evidence is
that the jury gets all of the information without preventing the prosecutor
or defendant from putting on experts or bringing in other information that
enables them both to put on the best case possible.
CONCLUSION
Juries are influenced and susceptible to fears and distrust of the
sentencing process. Therefore, the search for an approach wherejurors can
be confident of their decisions without prejudice to the defendant must
continue. States continue to make progress by recognizing that this is an
important issue and by attempting to implement procedures that act to
decrease the speculation of the jury. 9 At the same time, state legislatures
application for parole)).
212Id at 254-55.
2131 d at 255.
214 FED. R. EVID. 201.25 Paduano & Smith, supra note 5, at 255.
256 See id at 255 n.155. The actions taken at a parole hearing, although not
absolute, are predictable since it is subject to objective criteria. Id217 See generally discussion supra Part III.A.
See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
z See, e.g., discussion supra Part III (explaining how Virginia's law has
evolved as an attempt to allow the jurors to make decisions fully informed of the
parole consequences to the defendant); discussion supra Part IV (examining
Kentucky's bifurcated penalty proceedings).
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have continued to implement statutes that give the defendant a sentence that
he is more likely to serve.2" This is progress because it will work to change
the stereotypes jurors may have of the parole system. With both the
attitudes of the jurors and the policy of the courts changing, we continue to
get closer to a solution that allows jurors to be informed in capital
sentencing proceedings without subjecting the defendant to injustice.
See Symposium, supra note 174, at 80 tbl. I (showing which states have
received grant money for implementation of truth in sentencing legislation that will
focus on imposing longer and more determinate sentences).
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